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THE USE OF NONVIOLENT COERCION: A STUDY
IN LEGALITY UNDER ARTICLE 2(4) OF THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS'
Accordingly, if one commonwealth wishes to make
war on another and employ extreme measures to make
that other dependent on itself, it may lawfully make the
attempt .... I
I. INTRODUCTION
The partial oil embargo instituted by certain Arab nations in
the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War in the Middle East
suddenly involved nearly every industrialized nation in the af-
fairs of that troubled section of the globe. For all the shock and
surprise voiced by the oil-dependent nations, the Arab move was
within the tradition of international coercive policies. Interna-
tional law has long recognized and provided for the use of
economic sanctions by one combatant against another during a
time of war. Even the employment of economic measures against
neutrals, which gained such wide currency during the
Napoleonic Wars, has become an accepted part of our vocabu-
lary of "total war."
The Arab policy of regulating the supply of crude oil in
response to the customer nation's posture with regard to the
Middle East situation was a predictable, but nonetheless impor-
tant, expansion of this tradition. The embargo was directed at
noncombatant nations, after the armed conflict had ostensibly
ended. More importantly, there was no suggestion that the
economic measures would improve the Arabs' military position.
The sanctions were not aimed at influencing a military solution
of the Middle East dispute, but rather were intended to alter the
relative bargaining positions of the parties in some future politi-
cal settlement. President Houari Boumediene of Algeria, follow-
ing a meeting of Arab chiefs of state in November, 1973, is
reported to have expressed satisfaction over "the economic,
political and military weapons now in the hands of the Arabs. '2
A New York Times article appearing after the close of the confer-
' B. DE SPINOZA, Political Treatise, in THE CHIEF WORKS OF BENEDICT DE SPINOZA 287,
306-07 (R. Ewes transl. 1887).
2 N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
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ence reported that the participants had agreed "to exert con-
tinued economic pressure on outside countries by manipulating
Arab oil exports according to 'the attitude of every country
toward the Arab cause.' "3
The reaction of international jurists to this expansion of the
use of economic coercion is as yet uncertain. This Comment will
explore the legality of this type of coercion within, the context of
the body of international law that has developed around the
United Nations Charter. A conclusion reached under Charter
law does not, of course, preclude a separate judgment under
either customary or other positive international law from being
reached independently of the Charter.4 But this Comment will
consider legal sources outside the United Nations Charter only
insofar as they may shed light upon its interpretation.
II. ARTICLE 2(4) AND THE REALM OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS
International conflict, historically the inevitable result of the
lack of congruity in the goals and interests of sovereign States, is
perhaps the most formidable topic demanding the attention of
-the philosopher of world order. To a certain extent, the
difficulties inherent in minimizing hostile international confron-
tations are unlike those attending a similar effort within the
confines of a national system. Pacific settlement of disputes at
every echelon of human society is facilitated by the presence of a
third-party mediator-a person or institution clothed with the
authority to regulate such disputes and the strength necessary to
implement its regulations. Thus, children turn by instinct to a
parent as the final arbiter of sibling controversies, contentious
citizens seek a resolution of their differences in courts or cham-
bers of justice, and even otherwise independent states or ter-
ritories are often bound to bring their conflicts before a federal
authority. It is the absence of such a third-party mediator that
has blocked the path to peaceful adjudication of disputes at the
international level. A sovereign nation, by the very fact of its
sovereignty, is theoretically free to determine its own patterns of
action, unfettered by the precepts of any external authority.
5
3 Id.
" For a consideration of economic coercion in the light of non-Charter international
legal principles, particularly the principle of nonintervention, see Bowett, Economic
-Coercion and Reprisals by States, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1972).
5 This is, of course, only theoretically true. The notion of absolute sovereignty is at
best a metaphysical concept describing a situation in which no nation has ever found
itself. The mere existence of other nations implies at least a minimal constraint on the
freedom of any particular state. In a multinational world, any member state must
consider the feelings of its neighbors before taking action that affects them. To the extent
that it must do so it is not free, and to the extent that such a state is not free, it is not truly
sovereign. But to say that there are practical constraints upon a nation's freedom of
action is a far different thing from saying that there are legal, or perhaps even moral,
restrictions on its freedom. The proposition that the principles of international law exist
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Some theories consider the State's freedom to be limited only by
the dictates of its own national conscience, and by whatever
importance it chooses to ascribe to its international treaties and
the amorphous body of international law in general.6
The framers of the Charter of the United Nations under-
took to tear down this last bastion of the Hobbesian "state of
nature. '7 In the few decades preceding the drafting of this
document, history had witnessed the tragic results of an interde-
pendent world lacking both viable standards of international
conduct and effective sanctions to enforce those standards. The
Charter was designed to fill this vacuum.
Foremost in the minds of those drafting the Charter was the
necessity of effectively outlawing force as an instrument of
international policy. Following a commitment in the Preamble to
"save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which
twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind," the
heart of the Charter's proscriptions of international violence are
contained in article 2, sections 3 and 4. These provisions direct
that:
3.) All Members shall settle their international disputes
by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4.) All Members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territo-
rial integrity or political independence of any State, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations.8
independently of the respect given them by individual nations is at best arguable and
probably unsupported by the history of international behavior. With regard to the
individual state, "[n]o rules of international law are binding upon it but those which it has
created for itself through its consent. There is no lawgiving authority above it, for there is
no state or group of states which can legislate for it." H. MORGENTHAU, POLrIcs AMONG
NATIONS 301 (4th ed. 1967).
The greatest challenge to this consensual theory is presented by the view that certain
principles of international law can legitimately claim a universality derived from the basic
axioms of some panhuman morality. Although of considerable persuasive force, this view
rests on the concept of a priori norms of international behavior which are inherited by
each state at the moment of its assuming statehood. Most nations have not shown a great
willingness to accept such a vague, unwritten legacy.
' For a discussion of this view and its alternative, see J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF
NATIONS 46-57 (5th ed. 1955).
" Hobbes wrote: "Concerning ... what is commonly called the law of nations, I need
not say anything in this place; because the law of nations, and the law of nature, is the
same thing." T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 309 (J. Plamenatz ed. 1966). And earlier in the same
work: "Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice.
Force and fraud, are in war the two cardinal virtues." Id. 145.
' Note that neither of these provisions directly refers to war. Apparently the framers
accepted the wisdom of substituting "peace" terminology for that employed by the
Covenant of the League of Nations which admonished its members "in no case to resort
to war." LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 12, para. 1. See generally Eagleton, Covenant of
the League of Nations and Charter of the United Nations: Points of Difference, 13 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 263 (1945); Goodrich, From League of Nations to United Nations, in THE UNrrED
NATIONS 17 (R. Falk & S. Mendovitz eds. 1966).
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It is in article 2(4) that the Charter specifically attempts to
remove from the international arsenal that weapon which a
nation arguably inherits by virtue of its sovereignty-the right to
resort to force. Professor Henkin has described article 2(4) as the
"4principal norm of international law of our time."9 It is at least
clear that without this provision the delicate superstructure of
the Charter would lack a crucial normative foundation.
An inquiry into the meaning of article 2(4) as a norm of
international behavior requires not only an analysis of the sub-
stantive content of that norm, to which the bulk of this Comment
is devoted, but also a review of the nature of an international
norm. Analysis on both levels is complicated on the international
plane by the absence of any clear norm-giver or enforcer, and by
the common prejudice that principled evaluations of the actions
of nations are at best propaganda devices dictated only by
expediency. Clearly, then, any international organization which
attempts to achieve world order by advocating adherence to
certain behavioral norms must first establish both the nature and
the correctness of those norms.
The norm expressed by the prescriptive language of article
2(3) and its prohibitive counterpart, article 2(4), may be viewed
in a number of ways, each of which entails different conclusions
about the legal effect of these sections. First, the norm might be
viewed as essentially a matter of convenience-an arbitrary rule,
like a regulation governing the due date on a tax return, which
may be altered or abandoned without offending any rational
imperatives. Under this view, which commands considerable
rhetorical appeal, a violation of these sections is a mere technical
offense or breach of international etiquette, relatively free of
moral culpability. Given the grave potential consequences of
international coercion, few nations are apt to view a prohibition
against the use of force in international relations so lightly.
A second approach, which attributes slightly greater
significance to these sections, sees them not as describing the
existing legal situation of the world after the adoption of the
Charter, but rather as depicting the way things ought to be. The
norm is not a rule governing present conduct, nor is it a measure
of accountability for present behavior; it has at best a hortatory
effect. An offense against the norm is not a legal offense, but a
disappointment of expectations, which cannot realistically be
The serious danger that world leaders could exploit the labors of pedants in .irawing
fine distinctions within the body of learning known as the "laws of war" induced the
framers to circumvent this morass entirely. For a general discussion of the laws of war,
see P. BORDWELL, THE LAW OF WAR BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS (1908); Q. WRIGHT, A STUDY
OF WAR 88, 152, 329 (2d ed. 1965).
' Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 AM. J. INT'L
L. 544 (1971).
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punished by an international organization. This view, like the
first, treats too lightly the present dangers posed by the use of
force.
At the other extreme, these sections might be seen to con-
tain some first principle of international relations to which all
right-thinking minds must assent, and which would exist inde-
pendently of both the Charter and any other tenets of interna-
tional law. An offense against the norm would be an offense
regardless of the existence of the Charter: it would violate a
dictate of reason that does not need to be reduced to writing to
command assent.' 0 Given the ability of rational men to disagree
on almost any proposition, however, this view of a universal first
principle is a difficult one to defend, and an inadequate founda-
tion for so important a norm. Without some additional support,
the defender of a purported norm will find himself totally
stymied if his listener fails to accept the self-evident nature of the
principle.
Finally, the norm embodied in these sections may express
not a necessary, but merely a desirable, condition of civilized
interaction among nations. Viewed as such, the norm requires
both a practical justification in terms of the existing global
situation, and a legal foundation within the confines of interna-
tional law. The norm prohibiting the use of force is perhaps best
viewed in this way. It has a solid legal foundation in the United
Nations Charter and receives strong extrinsic support from its
importance in the international scene.
Assuming that this last conception of the norm contained in
articles 2(3) and 2(4) is the best one, the substantive content of
the norm is still quite vague. The framers of the Charter made
no attempt to add anything to the definition of "force" in this
article to limit the speculations of later commentators. Such
related terms as "aggression" and "coercion" were also left
undefined." By not specifying the denotation of the concept of
"force," those who drafted the Charter left the meaning of
article 2(4) vulnerable to whatever connotation the word has in
the minds of those reading it. The resultant situation is rather
awkward. Without the United Nations Charter, the world legal
situation with regard to international coercion is juridically not
'0 To forgo actual statement of the norm, as this view seems to suggest, would violate
the widely recognized principle of nullum crimen sine lege. It is perhaps an infirmity of the
legal mind that distracts it from giving effect to unproclaimed norms. But experience
within a domestic system has upheld- the wisdom of not allowing the lawgiver the
freedom to punish unspecified offenses. When so viewed, the principle is expressed as
nulla poena sine lege. There is no reason to believe that at this point in history any
international body will be permitted to punish actions on the ground that they have
strayed from an unwritten norm, hbwever rational. For a related discussion, see G. H.
VON VRIGHT, NORM AND ACTION: A LOGICAL INQUIRY 87-88 (1963).11 See Claude, The United Nations and the Use of Force, 1960-61 INT'L CONCILIATION
323, 325.
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unlike that described by Hobbes. Without article 2(4) the Charter
is at best a soulless document, and without some clear under-
standing of the meaning of this article signatory nations are left
guessing at the true import of a behavioral norm they have
purported to accept, not only for themselves, but for the rest of
the world as well.
12
This Comment will argue for a broad interpretation of the
word "force" in article 2(4)-in particular, its extension to in-
clude political and economic coercion. It will take the position
that such a reading is legitimate in light of other Charter provi-
sions and related documents; that it is persuasive, given the
projected maturation of international norms in response to a
continual complication of the global situation; and that it is
necessary, in view of the potentially disastrous consequences that
may attend a rigid adherence to the narrower prohibition of
simple armed force. Before turning to a discussion of the scope
of article 2(4), a brief outline of the hierarchies of coercion will
be useful.
III. THE HIERARCHIES OF COERCION
In its search for a viable foreign policy, a nation has at its
disposal a number of options which could fairly be listed under
the generic heading of coercion or force. These options include
several different kinds of coercion, each of which may be im-
plemented on an extremely broad spectrum of intensity and for
an almost limitless number of purposes, both licit and illicit. Any
conceptual framework used for the classification of international
events as permissible or impermissible uses of force must incor-
porate each of these elements: the nature, the intensity, and the
purpose of the coercion.1
3
A. Nature of the Coercion
International coercion, or the attempt by one independent
nation to influence the actions or policies of another by means
which extend beyond simple persuasion, can assume a number
of forms. Professors McDougal and Feliciano have suggested
that the strategies of coercion can be categorized according to
the distinctive means employed to influence another nation and
the particular ends that are sought. They conclude that the
resulting categories will enable us to distinguish between the
2 The basic elements of the world order established by the Charter are imposed on
even non-member States. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 6.
,3 Of course, to say that a particular instance of the resort to force between nations is
impermissible is not necessarily to say that it is therefore illegal. Unless the broader
reading of article 2(4) espoused herein is accepted, there are a great many forms of
coercion which, barring treaty obligations or an accepted precept of positive or customary
international law, could be called imprudent, unjust or even inhuman, but not illegal.
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diplomatic, ideological, economic and military instruments of
coercion.1 4 Some grouping along these lines appears sound.15
Such categories provide .an analytical framework against which
we can begin to measure our norms of the permissible or
impermissible, legal or illegal use of international force. For our
purposes three broad divisions can be highlighted.16
1. Military Force
Armed warfare is the clearest, and perhaps the oldest,
compulsive method of achieving national goals in the world
arena. It consists of military conflict between nations or groups
of nations and is often accompanied by undisguised invasion of
another's territory either for aggressive or defensive purposes.
Although listed first here, military force is typically the method
of compulsion that is resorted to when less obvious means of
coercion have failed to achieve their desired goals.
2. Intermediate Coercion
The unmentionable finality of thermonuclear war has
perhaps had a chilling effect on the use of all-out military force
as an instrument of national policy, at least by the leaders of the
world's larger nations. In addition it may be hoped that the fear
of triggering nuclear war has led these leaders to recognize the
need to avoid even the more conventional (i.e., non-nuclear)
genre of armed confrontation.' 7 The search for effective tools of
international influence therefore demands an increasing reliance
on more subtle, or at least less direct, modes of compulsion.
The history of international relations since 1945 speaks
convincingly for the proposition that two states, while not truly at
peace, may nevertheless not actually be in a state of war with
14 McDougal & Feliciano, International Coercion and World Public Order: The General
Principles of the Law of War, 67 YALE L.J. 771, 792 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Princples].
This article is the first of a series of three highly recommended pieces on the law of war
by the same authors. The others are McDougal & Feliciano, The Initiation of Coercion: A
Multi-Temporal Analysis, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 241 (1958); McDougal & Feliciano, Legal
Regulation of Resort to International Coercion: Aggression and Self-Defense in Policy Perspective,
68 YALE L.J. 1057 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Regulation]. The articles are reprinted in
M. McDoUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961).
15 See Special Comm. on the Question of Defining Aggression, 1956 Report, 12 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. 16, at 30-33, U.N. Doc. A/3574 (1957).
16 These categories have been exhaustively examined by McDougal and Feliciano,
Principles, supra note 14, and they are mentioned here only by way of introduction.
Definitions and discussion may also be found in N. PALMER & H. PERKINS, INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 95-240 (2d ed. 1957); THE SEARCH FOR WORLD ORDER 97-110 (A. Lepawsky,
E. Buehrig & H. Lasswell eds. 1971).
17 See Dunn, Book Review, 11 WORLD POLrrTICs 278, 279 (1959):
The recent spectacular developments in military weapons have sharply restricted
the utility of coercion as a means of changing the status quo. The destructiveness
of nuclear weapons is out of all proportion to any political gains that might be
achieved by war. There is no certainty that even mild forms of coercion would
not eventually lead to their use.
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each other. They can occupy an intermediate status between
these extremes and seek to influence each other by intermediate
forms of coercion-that is, by nonamicable measures short of
war.'8 Two notable examples of intermediate coercive instru-
ments which have had some currency in this century are ideo-
logical coercion and indirect coercion. Ideological coercion in-
volves the use of hostile propaganda directed at the citizens of a
foreign state for any number of reasons-for example, inciting
them to revolution, expounding the virtues of the originating
state, or discrediting the government of the target state. 19 Indi-
rect coercion has been characterized by the International Law
Commission as including "the fomenting of civil strife by one
State in another, the arming by a State of organized bands for
offensive purposes directed against another State, and the send-
ing of 'volunteers' to engage in hostilities against another
State."20
The recent concern generated by the extensive use of in-
termediate coercion has begun to crystallize into more or less
accepted norms for its regulation. In certain cases intermediate
coercion has been assimilated into the more traditional body of
legal theory concerned with the laws of war in general. With
regard to other measures unknown to the classic writers, such as
the use of ideological coercion, the traditional learning can be
applied only by analogy. 21 If nothing else, this process has
demonstrated a certain flexibility in the creation of new norma-
tive standards compelled by a change in the complexion of
international coercion.
3. Economic and Political Coercion
Should a state determine, either from lack of volition or lack
of ability, to refrain from the use of direct or indirect military
force, it is still not without tools to implement policy in the
international sphere. At least two nonviolent modes of influence,
the diplomatic (or political) and economic, are still available.
Diplomacy has always been a method, employed with vary-
18 For an espousal of the "intermediate" terminology see Jessup, Should International
Law Recognize an Intermediate Status Between Peace and War?, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 98 (1954).
See generally F. GROB, THE RELATIVITY OF WAR AND PEACE (1949).
19 For discussions of ideological coercion, see Kelsen, Collective Security Under Interna-
tiolal Law, INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 65 (1954); L. MARTIN, INTERNATIONAL
PROPAGANDA (1958); J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 318-23
(1954).
For an exhaustive recent study of this topic see B. MURTY, PROPAGANDA AND WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER (1968). Note in particular Murty's distinction between persuasion and
coercion. Id. 27-32.
20 Int'l L. Comm'n, Report, 6 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/1858 (1951).
For a more detailed analysis of the notion of indirect coercion, see Special Comm. on
Principles of Int'l Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States,
Report. 20 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item Nos. 90 & 94, at 77 U.N. Doc. A/5746
[hereinafter cited as Friendly Relations Report].
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ing degrees of success, of both conveying a nation's wishes to its
neighbors and applying pressure toward achieving compliance
with those wishes. Professors McDougal and Feliciano explain:
The coercive impact of a use of diplomacy may be the
direct result of the content of the communication con-
veyed .... [Or] [i]t may... be the net effect of complex
diplomatic strategy designed to isolate or encircle the
target-state by securing from third states either agree-
ments to support the initiator-state or by inducing them
to withdraw or withhold support from the target.
22
Economic coercion may entail any or all of the traditional
methods of economic compulsion.23 Although it is by no means
novel, this weapon has assumed tremendous importance as the
nations of the world have grown to depend upon one another
for the requirements of everyday living. Countries relying on
world markets for food or industrial raw materials are vulnera-
ble to compulsive measures such as boycotts, embargoes, or
attempts by rival nations to feeeze the victim-state's assets or dry
up its markets on a global scale. 24 In addition, the ascendancy of
foreign aid has added a new dimension to the realm of interna-
tional economic persuasion. A nation can employ its foreign aid
program coercively by offering aid as a reward for the donee
country's pursuit of acceptable policies and by withholding aid
(perhaps previously relied on) as a punitive measure to discour-
age deviation.
The "carrot" model has gained wide acceptance as the basis
of an enlightened foreign aid policy. The punitive foreign aid
approach, on the other hand, has been criticized as "blunt" and
"clumsy." '-' 5 For example, Professor Olmstead notes that
the most effective means of influencing policy in de-
veloping countries and of advancing'our nation's objec-
tives is to grant United States economic assistance to
those countries that take necessary internal action to
provide a domestic environment conducive to economic
and social development within a context of freedom.
26
2' See generally F. GROB, supra note 18, at 189-324 (1949).
22 McDougal & Feliciano, Principles, supra note 14, at 792. That article also contains a
short bibliography of the diplomatic instrument of coercion, id. n.74. See also R. ARON,
PEAC. AND WAR 61 (1966).
2 For a discussion of these traditional weapons, see N. PALMER & H. PERKINS, supra
note 16. at 160-78.
11 A curious consequence is that a developing nation with an agrarian economy,
although quite susceptible to military or quasi-military aggression, is relatively less
vulnerable to economic aggression.25 Brown, The Use of Foreign Aid as an Instrument to Secure Compliance with International
Obligations, 58 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 210, 214 (1964).
' 6 Olmstead, Foreign Aid as an Effective Means of Persuasion, 58 AM. Soc'Y IN 'l. L.
PROc. 205, 210 (1964). A similar observation has been offered by Barbara Ward Jackson:
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B. Intensity of the Coercion
Within each of the three categories mentioned above, coer-
cion can assume a number of intensities. In the area of ideologi-
cal coercion, for instance, a country may select measures ranging
all the way from a mild rebuke of the target nation's actions in
the official publications of the coercing government, to extrater-
ritorial broadcasting and airborne pamphleteering. 27 Similarly, a
nation may confine its use of armed force to a particular branch
of the military, such as the Navy or Air Force, or it may engage
in "limited" or "conventional" warfare-which may include per-
mitting only "tactical" (i.e., low-yield) nuclear weapons.
A judgment on the permissibility of coercive action, whether
that judgment be moral, practical or legal, must take into ac-
count the intensity of the method of compulsion employed in
relation to the intended goal and the degree of provocation.
Thus, it is possible that even nonviolent methods of coercion,
such as the use of propaganda, may be adjudged impermissible
when employed without sufficient provocation.
C. Purpose of the Coercion
The third element which enters into any consideration of
the acceptability of a coercive international policy is the merit of
the goal that the nation seeks to achieve. For instance, under the
Charter of the United Nations, which purports to outlaw war,
the resort to armed force is legitimate only in self-defense
against an armed attack 28 or as a part of a lawful United Nations
enforcement action.29 Similarly, the suspension of foreign aid as
a means of obtaining compensation for entrepreneurs whose
overseas assets have been nationalized may command a different
legal or ethical judgment than the same act undertaken for the
sole purpose of weakening a disfavored political regime.
D. Conclusion
Unless all means of coercion are considered illegitimate-a
position unlikely to prevail in today's international
atmosphere-to say that a particular coercive act is impermissible
means that it was undertaken with unnecessary intensity, or for
"The most persuasive pressure is likely to come not from the negative side of refusing aid
where reform is lacking but from the positive side of aid generously given when
conditions are favorable." Jackson, Foreign Aid: Strategy or Stopgap?, 41 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
90, 101 (1962).2 7 See, e.g., 9 U.N. SCOR, Supp. Apr.-June 1954, at 11-12, U.N. Doc. S/3232 (1954)
(government of Guatemala describing airborne pamphleteering by unidentified planes).
28 U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
29 Id. art. 39. For a discussion of the implications of this article, see L. GOODRICH, E.
HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 342-53 (3d ed. 1969).
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an improper purpose. However, there are no rigid categories of
the "permissible" or "impermissible" into which a particular
action may be placed without delicate sifting and balancing.
Perhaps the strongest statement which can be made in a world
which ostensibly has accepted the Charter of the United Nations
is that the use of armed force, for any purpose not explicitly
condoned by article 39 or article 51 of the Charter,31 - is prima
facie illegal regardless of intensity. Another weighty body of
opinion would extend the prohibition of armed force to include
indirect military and ideological coercion. 3 1 But even the limita-
tion on intermediate force is not explicitly authorized by the
Charter, and many would argue that a blanket prohibition,
without regard to the elements of intensity or purpose, would
impose an undesirable rigidity on the affairs of nations. With
regard to economic and political coercion, each with its wide
range of intensity, the waters become even murkier. It is with the
problem of this last, most obscure, level of coercion that the
remainder of the Comment will concern itself.
IV. THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 2(4)
In 1965, at the twentieth session of the General Assembly,
the Special Committee on Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States sub-
mitted a report32 which contained an extensive but inconclusive
discussion of the merits of reading into article 2(4) a prohibition
of the use of economic and political force, at least when it
constitutes a threat to the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of the target state. The committee debate focused on
four proposals. Two of these proposals, those submitted by
Czechoslovakia33 and Yugoslavia,34 explicitly stated that the
principle of article 2(4)'s prohibition of force includes both
economic and political pressure. A joint proposal submitted by
Ghana, India and Yugoslavia contained the same suggestion, at
least by implication. 35 The United Kingdom, on the other hand,
0See notes 28-29 supra & accompanying text.
3 See McDougal & Feliciano, Regulation, supra note 14, at 1059-60.
32 Friendly Relations Report, supra note 20.
33
1d. 84, U.N. Doc. A/AC.119/L.6.34 Id., U.N. Doc. A/AC.1 19/L.7. The Czechoslavakian proposal contained the princi-
ple that "States shall refrain from economic, political or any other form of pressure
aimed against the political independence or territorial integrity of any State." The
corresponding section of the Yugoslavian proposal reads: "States shall ... desist from
resorting to, or relying upon, force in any of its forms in their relations with other States,
and from exerting pressure, whether by military, political, economic, or any other means,
against the political independence or territorial integrity of any other State."
3 5 Id. 85, U.N. Doc. A/AC.1 19/L.15: "The term 'force' shall include: ... other forms
of pressure, which have the effect of threatening the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State."
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sought to limit the meaning of force to armed force36 and
specifically abjured the inclusion of lesser forms of coercion.
37
Despite attempts by adherents of both views to marshal
arguments from the legislative history of article 2(4) and from its
relation to other provisions of the Charter, no consensus on the
question was reached.38 As is so often the case with documents of
this kind, Charter exegesis alone provides no clear resolution of
the question. While any acceptable interpretation must rest on
firm textual and historical grounds, it must also rest on an
analysis of the advisability of a broad interpretation of article
2(4) in light of changes in the world situation since the drafting
of the Charter.
A. The Case for a Limited Reading of Article 2(4)
1. Charter Exegesis
Proponents of the view that article 2(4) was never meant to
outlaw anything but armed force can turn to the records of the
United Nations Conference on International Organization held
at San Francisco in 1945. The Brazilian delegation proposed to
extend the prohibition of article 2(4) to cover "the threat or use
of economic measures in any manner inconsistent" with the
United Nations' purposes. 39 The amendment was rejected,40 but
the reasons for its disapproval are not clear. During the discus-
sion of the amendment the Belgian delegate suggested that
Brazil was underestimating the reach of the phrase "in any other
manner," which had been added to the original text.41 In addi-
tion, the Report of Rapporteur of Committee I to Commission I
included a statement that "the unilateral use of force of similar
coercive measures is not authorized or admitted. ' 42 The rejec-
tion of the Brazilian amendment may have reflected either
opposition to the principle it contained or simply the belief of
some of the delegates that the Charter already embodied its
36 1d. 84, U.N. Doc. A/AC.119/L.8: "2. By the expression 'force' as used in paragraph
1 above is meant armed force ... "37 d. 85. For examples of commentators who believe the term "force" in article 2(4)
should be read as "armed force," see N. BENTWICH & A. MARTIN, A COMMENTARY ON THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 13 (1950); L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS,
supra note 29, at 49; L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 149 (1968); 2 L. OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 153 (7th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1952).
Broader readings of "force" are to be found in: H. KELSEN, THE UNITED NATIONS:
TEN YEARS LEGAL PROGRESS 4-5 (1956); McDougal & Feliciano, Regulation, supra note 14,
at 1059-60.
3 8 For a summary of the arguments presented, see id. 88-90.
39 Doc. 215, I/l/10, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 527, 559 (1945).
40 Doc. 784, I/1/27, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 331, 334-35 (1945).
41 Id. 334.
42 Doc. 885, I/1/34, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 387, 400 (1945) (emhasis added).
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principle.43 Undoubtedly one factor which contributed to the
amendment's ultimate rejection was the vagueness of the notion
of an "impermissible" use of economic force.
Given the general princip!e that any one section of the
Charter ought not to be read in vacuo but rather as an integral
part of the document considered as a whole, a number of
arguments can be adduced to support the narrower reading of
2(4). For example, since the inherent right to self-defense of a
target state, embodied in article 51, 44 is limited to situations in
which an armed attack has previously occurred, reading article
2(4) to include economic or political coercion would seem to
create a lacuna in the Charter. A target state could be the victim
of an illegal use of force and yet find itself unable legally to
exercise its natural right of self-defense.45
Article 39 of the Charter sets forth the "situations in which
the Security Council may take measures to maintain interna-
tional peace and security" as those which present "a threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression." Unless one is
willing to permit the Council to regard a use of economic or
political coercion as posing such a threat, the Security Council is
powerless to take measures against the state that resorts to these
forms of coercion. Read in conjunction with the argument from
article 51, this means that a broad reading of article 2(4) would
produce a situation in which a state victimized by an illegal use of
economic or political force could neither legally take steps in
self-defense nor even expect effective help from the United
Nations. Supporters of the narrower reading of article 2(4) find
in this paradox an indication that the word "force," when used
alone, can mean only "armed force." Similarly, other Charter
provisions draw a fairly clear distinction between armed force
and other kinds of coercion. The preamble says that "armed
force shall not be used, save in the common interest," and article
41, which outlines the means by which the Security Council can
give effect to its decisions, states: "The Security Council may
decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are
43 Other commentators who regard the travaux priparatoires as ambiguous include J.
STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 97-98 (1958); Higgins, The Legal Limits to the Use
of Force by Sovereign States: United Nations Practice, 37 BRIT. Y.B. IN'r'L L. 269, 277 n.2
(1961).
44 The pertinent part of article 51 reads: "Nothing in the presert Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations .... " See generally M. FINKELSTEIN & L.
FINKELSTEIN, COLLECTIVE SECURITY (1966); M. Rangel, Collective Self-Defense and Ag-
gression under the United Nations Charter, 1971 (unpublished thesis in Biddle Law
Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School).
a5 This argument is taken from 20 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item Nos. 90, 94,
at 88, para. 53 (1965). For the response to this argument, see text accompanying notes
53-56 infra.
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to be employed. . . . These may include complete or partial
interruption of economic relations." This clear distinction of
economic pressure from armed force can be interpreted as
showing that when the framers wished to refer to both coercive
methods, they mentioned both.46
2. Other Problems with an Expansive Reading
If article 2(4) is read to extend to economic and political
coercion, difficulties will undoubtedly arise in separating legal
from illegal uses of these forms of coercion. All states attempt to
exercise some degree of influence in their normal acts of diplo-
macy and trade, and certainly not all such attempts should be
branded as illegal. Determination of legality would necessarily
involve a delicate balancing of such factors as the severity of the
action, its objective and its place within a pattern of similarly
unacceptable coercive actions. While the difficulty of making
such determinations should not prevent us from reading article
2(4) to cover economic and political coercion if that reading is in
other respects the preferable one, this difficulty must at least be
acknowledged as a real factor militating against adoption of such
an expansive reading.
Professor Louis Henkin has offered another argument
against an expansive reading of article 2(4):
For the present [1963], then, it may serve little
purpose to insist that Article 2(4) goes farther than
many nations will tolerate. It may be better to leave its
authority clear and undisputed to cover at least cases of
direct, overt aggression which are generally capable of
objective and persuasive proof . . . . The battle of
interventions, for the present, will have to be fought as.... 47
political battles with little help from law.
Although these remarks were directed to the scope of article
2(4) in the area of indirect aggression, whatever weight the
argument commands in that context would seem to apply to the
still more subtle devices of economic and political coercion.
Henkin's argument rests either on the fear that the nations of
the world are simply unwilling to accept any inhibitions on their
use of nonviolent coercion, or on the fear that the inevitable
balancing of motives which would characterize the application of
article 2(4) to cases of economic and political coercion would be
46 This argument is taken from 20 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item Nos. 90, 94,
at 88, para. 49 (1965). For the countervailing argument, see text accompanying notes
49-51 infra.
47 Henkin, Force, Intervention, and Neutrality in Contemporary International Law, 57 AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. Pioc. 147, 158-59 (1963).
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transferred to cases of military force, thereby weakening its
effectiveness in the area of military force. In either case, the
argument is that rather than turn article 2(4) into an unwieldy
behavioral norm, it would be better to bring the full weight of
the article to bear on the most conspicuous and dangerous
problem-open, armed aggression.48
B. The Case for an Expansive Reading
The basic arguments for expanding the scope of article 2(4)
to include some political and economic policies may be reduced
to three. They are: that the inclusion of these coercions is
legitimate within the textual confines of the Charter; that other
international documents drafted since the Charter came into
effect demonstrate a growing world sensitivity to the problem
posed by the use of political and economic weapons; and that
outlawing this genre of coercion can have only a salutary effect
on international relations, and may well constitute a necessary
step in the evolution of normative standards of international
coercive conduct.
1. Charter Exegesis
Perhaps the strongest argument for the broad reading of
article 2(4) is to be found in the language of the provision
itself.49 Although aware of the many methods by which one
modern nation can coerce another,5 0 the framers did not embel-
lish the word "force" with adjectives that would have had the
effect of limiting its scope. Instead, they chose to leave it
open-ended and adaptable to the inevitable growth and sophisti-
cation of coercive measures. The framers were not ignorant of
the vagueness inherent in the word "force." Where they meant
to say armed force, such as in the preamble and in article 46,
they said armed force. 51
That article 51 permits self-defense only against a previous
48 Professor Henkin apparently believes that article 2(4) still has some ascertainable
effect in limiting armed conflict. See Henkin, supra note 9. For the opposing view, see
Franck, Who Killed Artice 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, 64
Am. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970).
49 Many of the arguments set forth in this section were raised in Friendly Relations
Report, supra note 20, at 88-90, and during the 6th Committee's consideration of that
report, 20 U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm. 870th-894th, 896th-898th meetings (1965).
0"But cf. text accompanying notes 39-43 supra & sources cited.
51 The only exception to this rule is in article 44 where the word "force" appears
without modification, although a reading of that article makes it dear that the only
possible interpretation is "armed force." Article 44 provides:
When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon
a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the
obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so
desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the
employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:983
armed attack52 is not necessarily inconsistent with the broad
reading of article 2(4). By circumscribing the right to resort to
military force, the framers sought to exclude the practice of
preemptive or anticipatory attacks53 on the part of a soi-disant
"threatened" nation. In so doing they narrowed the right of
armed self-defense to situations involving prior acts of armed
aggression.54 But barring military response to nonmilitary ag-
gression does not necessarily condone other aggression or im-
munize the aggressor from proportionate retaliation or legal
sanctions. A victim State may, not inconsistently with the letter or
the spirit of the Charter, respond to nonviolent coercion with
nonviolent measures of its own,55 seek redress before the Sec-
urity Council,56 or both.
Not only the language of article 2(4), but also the expressed
purposes and principles of the Charter, support a broad reading.
The preamble bespeaks the intention of the signatory nations "to
practice tolerance and live in peace with one another as good
neighbors." Article 1(1) includes within the purposes of the
United Nations the desire "to take effective collective measures
for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,... and
to bring about by peaceful means... adjustment or settlement of
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach
of the peace . .." Similarly, article 1(2) envisions the develop-
ment of "friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peo-
ples . .. ."
Purely as a matter of consistency, article 2(4)'s textual prox-
imity to sweeping statements of the goals of the organi-
zation-which make no attempt to particularize the meanings of
terms like "breach of the peace" or "aggression"-suggests that it
should be read broadly in order to effectuate those purposes.
Why would the drafters, after eloquently expressing their desire
for a peaceful, harmonized world, limit the first clear precept
embodying this goal to one particular kind of disharmonizing
activity-armed warfare? The delegates drafting this instrument
were undoubtedly aware that armed conflict was often not the
52 Note 44 supra & accompanying text.
53 See Leitel, The United Nations Charter as a Restraint Upon a Nation's Right to Wage
War, 36 BROOKLYN L. REv. 212, 226-27 (1970).5 4 But see McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 Art. J. INT'L L.
507, 598 (1963).
55 For a -persuasive argument to this effect, see D. BowEr, SELF-DEFENSE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 107-08 (1958); Bowett, supra note 4, at 7-8.
5 6 The victim-state can ask the Security Council to exercise its broad discretion in
determining what is a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression"under article 39, that is subject to the enforcement measures of article 41. Nothing in the
language of the Charter compels the Council to limit enforcement to situations involving
the use of armed force, and any reasonable conception of the Council's role in the
containment of international disputes would appear to forbid such a limitation.
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cause of international unrest but rather the purported "cure" for
it: a nation will sometimes go to war as a result of extreme
nonmilitary provocations. An international Charter seeking to
promote international harmony clearly must remove the under-
lying roots and symptoms of global strife as well as its military
manifestations.
The United Nations Charter has a constitutional character,
57
and it is an axiom of constitution-drafting that the instrument
must be imbued with enough force and clarity to make it
effective, and yet have enough flexibility and expansiveness to
ensure against obsolescence. The framers were undoubtedly
aware of the possibility that new forms of international coercion
would rise to prominence in future generations. They must also
have known that these changes in the complexion of interna-
tional compulsion would in no way diminish its inflammatory
character or the attending dangers to world peace. The language
of article 2(4) had to be open-ended if it was to remain effective
as a behavioral norm; the history of the United States Constitu-
tion has shown the necessity of formulating new protections for
liberty as new dangers to it arise.58 Similarly the Charter of the
United Nations must either permit or even encourage the evolu-
tion of norms that are responsive to new dangers, or be rele-
gated to the status of an irrelevant historical document. Such an
event would dearly be repugnant to the spirit of the Charter and
to the intention of those who wrote it.
2. Other International Documents
The search for an understanding of the meaning of the
term "force" in article 2(4) need not be confined within the four
corners of the Charter itself. Extraneous sources offer evidence
of the kinds of nonamicable influence which are presently oc-
cupying the attention of draftsmen of international documents.
While these sources cannot directly affect the meaning of article
2(4) they do evidence world recognition of the need to define
more precisely the notion of impermissible coercion, and offer
some indication of current trends of thought in this regard. The
United Nations, insofar as it purports to embody world opinion
on the measures necessary to insure peace, cannot easily ignore
these manifestations of concern. It will suffice for the purposes
of this Comment to mention briefly three contexts in which the
abuse of economic and political power has been considered: the
search for a workable definition of aggression; General Assembly
5
7
See I. CLAUDE, SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES h. 9 (1956).
5 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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resolutions speaking directly to the subject of nonmilitary coer-
cion; and international treaties that touch upon the same subject.
a. The Elusive Definition of Aggression
The history of the United Nations has been marked by
repeated attempts to define the term "aggression." These ap-
parently Sisyphean efforts have sprouted a voluminous literature
dealing not only with the merits of particular proposed
definitions, but also with the wisdom of even attempting the
task.59 It is not the purpose of this section to summarize this
literature, but rather to point out what seems to be a growing
awareness of the need to expand the concept of aggression to
encompass forms of coercion other than open armed attack.60
The Conventions for the Definition of Aggression, 61 signed
in 1933 by the Soviet Union and its neighbors, provide a conven-
ient example of the early view of aggression as limited to the use
of undisguised military force. Article II of the Conventions
defines aggression as a declaration of war, an armed invasion, an
attack by land, naval or air forces, a naval blockade, or aid to
armed banks invading the territory of another state. Economic
and political coercion were mentioned only as inadequate
justifications for aggression, in article III. This Soviet view be-
came the model for much of the League of Nations' definitional
efforts and for some regional and bilateral treaties drafted
during the 1920's and '30's.62
With the exception of a definition of aggression offered by
the Phillipines at the San Francisco Conference in 1945,63 which
5 Some highlights of the literature on aggression are: J. STONE, supra note 43 (a
comprehensive study of the United Nations work in this area); A. THOMAS & A. J.
THOMAS, THE CONCEPT OF AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1972); The General
Problem of Defining Aggression, 2 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (Supp. 1 1972); Hazard, Why
Try Again to Define Aggression?, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 701 (1968); Sohn, The Definition of
Aggression, 45 VA. L. REv. 697 (1959); Harvard Research in International Law, Draft
Convention on Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 819-909
(1939); Wright, The Prevention of Aggression, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 514 (1956); Wright,
The Concept of Aggression in International Law, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 373 (1935).
'0 This observation is not original. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 59, at 708:
From the early years when attention of the draftsmen was focused primarily
upon 'force and threat of force,' and a narrow interpretation of 'force' as being
only 'armed force,' the draftsmen have moved far. Now there are claims that
'force' takes many forms, and 'arms' can be of several kinds. All present danger
to sovereignty to those against whom they are used.
"' The Conventions were signed by the U.S.S.R. and by Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia,
Persia, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Turkey and Yugoslavia. July 3, 1933, 147
L.N.T.S. 67; July 4, 1933, 148 L.N.T.S. 211. The language of the Conventions tracks that
of a Soviet proposal to the Committee on Security Questions of the 1933 Conference for
the Reduction and Limitations of Armaments. The text may be found in Secretary
General Report, 7 U.N. GAOR, Annex, Agenda Item No. 54, at 34-35, U.N. Doc. A/2211
(1952), which lists the attempts to define aggression up to 1952.
6 See J. STONE, supra note 43, at 34-38.
63 Doc. 2, G/14(k), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 535, 538 (1945). The delegates at San
Francisco ultimately decided not to include a definition of aggression in the Charter, Doc.
881, 111/3/46, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 502, 505 (1945). They chose instead to let the Security
Council grapple with the problem under article 39.
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would have condemned indirect coercive measures and certain
forms of ideological aggression, it was not until the early 1950's
that any significant expansion of the concept of aggression
entered the picture. In 1951, the International Law Commission
submitted its Report on The Question of Defining Aggression. 64
Neither in its consideration of the definition of aggression nor in
its Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind was the Commission willing to extend the concept of
aggression substantially beyond that contained in the 1933 Con-
ventions. But by the time the Sixth Committee met in 1952,
representatives of the smaller nations, notably the Latin Ameri-
can bloc, had begun to press for a broad definition that would
include economic, cultural and ideological aggression as threats
to a nation's sovereignty. During the course of the Sixth
Committee's debates, the Afghan delegation took the position
that economic aggression was "perhaps the most dangerous of
all" forms of aggression, and refused to accept any definition
that did not make specific mention of economic aggression.
6 5
The Argentine delegation concurred in the belief that a
definition which did not take into account economic force would
be valueness.66
A 1953 Soviet draft definlition 67 provides the most com-
prehensive codification of the fears expressed by some nations
that economic and political aggression would replace, without a
great difference in result, the use of armed force as a means of
fulfilling national policies. Subdivision 3 of the U.S.S.R. Draft
Resolution reads:
That State shall be declared to have committed an
act of economic aggression which first commits one of
the following acts:
(a) Takes against another State measures of eco-
nomic pressure violating its sovereignty and economic
independence and threatening the bases of its economic
life;
(b) Takes against another State measures prevent-
ing it from exploiting or nationalizing its own natural
ricnes;
(c) Subjects another State to an economic blockade.
The Soviet proposal also contained definitions of indirect
and ideological aggression, and a section which would have
permitted the Security Council to declare any other act not
61 Int'l L. Comm'n, Report, supra note 20.
6 7 U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm. 145 (1952).66 1d. 171.
67 U.N. Doc. A/AC.66/L.2/Rev.1 (1953).The text of the Soviet draft is contained in
Special Comm. on the Question of Defining Aggression, Report, 9 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
11, U.N. Doc. A/2638 at 13-14 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Aggression Report].
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specifically listed in the proposal "to be an attack or an act of
economic, ideological or indirect aggression."6 8
The debates on the definition of aggression, continuing well
into the middle 1960's, evidence an intense concern on the part
of third world nations with the effect of economic and political
weapons, and a belief on the part of those nations that some
international restriction of these weapons is desirable. The Boli-
vian delegate noted in 1953 that "[a]rmed aggression was a
recourse to force, economic aggression was a recourse only to
pressure, but it could lead a country not only to civil war and loss
of independence, but also to reduce it to poverty and famine.
'69
A similar sentiment has been expressed by the delegate from
Dahomey:
At the present day, economic aggression is the most
common form of aggression .... By adopting coercive
economic measures and by using economic pressures,
the industrialized countries could imperil the economic
and hence the political independence of the developing
countries. This form of aggression is contrary to certain
principles of the United Nations.
7
1
There has recently been a trend toward separating the
problem of economic and political coercion from the debate over
the definition of aggression,71 and concentrating on incorporat-
ing these measures into the general understanding of article
2(4). A 1971 draft proposal submitted by the U.S.S.R. on the
question of the definition of aggression abandoned reference to
economic aggression and merely added a proviso that other acts
may be deemed to constitute aggression if they are declared to
be such by the Security Council. 72 The omission of economic and
political coercion in the reports of the latest Special Committees
on the Question of Defining Agression 73 appears to reflect a
decision that, in the future, these bodies will restrict themselves
68 Aggression Report, supra note 67, U.N. Doc. A/2638 at 13.
69 1d., U.N. Doc. A/2638 at 8-9. A prior Bolivian draft resolution included in the
definition of aggression "unilateral action whereby a State is deprived of the economic
resources derived from the proper conduct of international trade, or its basic economy is
endangered." Id. 15, U.N. Doc. A/AC.66/L.9. The Bolivian delegate asserted that
economic aggression violated fundamentally three basic principles of the United
Nations: the principle of the political independence of States, that of their
sovereign equality and that of non-interference in their domestic affairs. ...
Political independence was closely linked with economic independence; thus
anything which threatened economic independence was as much an act of
aggression as was armed aggression.
Id. 8.
70 Contained in a note verbale from the Dahomey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated
22 February 1965, U.N. Doc. A/AC./91/4 (1965).
71 Bowett, supra note 4, at 3 n.12.
72 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 19, at 23, 24; U.N. Doc. AIAC.134/L.12 (1971).
73 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 19, U.N. Doc. A/9019 (1973); 26 U.N. GOAR Supp. 19,
U.N. Doc. A/8419 (1971).
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to formulating a definition of armed aggression. Undoubtedly in
response to the utter failure of these definitional forays, those
interested in calling attention to impermissible forms of coercion
have resorted to General Assembly resolutions to express their
concerns.
b. Resolutions of the General Assembly
In the course of its proceedings the General Assembly of the
United Nations periodically adopts resolutions and declarations
which provide a convenient barometer of world concern with
international coercion in its various guises. As was the case with
the proposed definitions of aggression, these General Assembly
pronouncements have over the years grown more and more
critical of several methods of nonviolent coercion that have
increasingly made themselves felt in the arena of international
relations.
Two early General Assembly resolutions exemplify the un-
certain attitude of the late 1940's and early 1950's toward coer-
cions short of armed attack. Although the texts of those resolu-
tions do not limit themselves to armed force, they contain no
specific mention of other forms of coercion. A 1949 resolution
called upon all nations "[t]o refrain from any threats or acts,
direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, indepen-
dence or integrity of any State ....- 7 In a similar vein a 1950
resolution contained the assertion that "whatever the weapons
used, any aggression.., is the gravest of all crimes against peace
and security throughout the world .... -75
By 1965, the delegates had begun to show concern over the
proliferation of nonviolent forms of coercion. They specifically
condemned such lesser coercions in a Declaration on the Inad-
missibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and
the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty:
1.) . . . [A]rmed intervention and all other forms of
interference or attempted threats against the personal-
ity of the State or against its political, economic and
cultural elements, are condemned.
2.) No State may use or encourage the use of economic,
political or any other type of measures to. coerce
another State in order to obtain from it the subordina-
tion of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure
from it advantages of any kind . . . .76
The same wording was included five years later in a Dedaration
74 Essentials for Peace, G.A. Res. 290, U.N. Doc. A/I251 at 13 (1949).
75 Peace Through Deeds, G.A. Res. 380, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 13, U.N. Doc.
A/1775 (1950).76 G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966).
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on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations.7 7 Equally explicit was this lan-
guage from a 1969 resolution:
The United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties ...
Solemnly condemns the threat or use of pressure in any
form, whether military, political, or economic, by any
State in order to coerce another State to perform any
act relating to the conclusion of a treaty in violation of
the principles of the sovereign equality of States and
freedom of consent .... 78
There appear to be two strains running through these
pronouncements. Some condemn economic coercion as a
weapon-that is, as an instrument for forcing another nation to
adjust its national policy or foreign posture. Others in4ly that
economic coercion may be accomplished by any method of
compulsion, so long as it is aimed at securing economic advan-
tages over or concessions from the victim State. In ofte context,
the term refers to the nature of the means used; in the other, to
the character of the goals sought. Of course, the two meanings
are often merged in practice. Economic weapons invariably pro-
duce economic effects, while an attack upon a nation's economy
will often result in undermining its governmental or political
structure.
c. Treaties
Since the drafting of the United Nations Charter in 1945, a
great number of bilateral and multilateral treaties have
reaffirmed the signatories' commitment to the principles it
expressed.7 9 Some of these documents have elaborated on the
wording of article 2(4) with regard to the prohibited methods of
coercion. Such documents typically either enumerate the pros-
7 G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028-at 121, 123 (1971).
While clearly deploring the use of economic coercion as a means of attaining interna-
tional objectives, the resolution put its condemnation in terms of the principle of
non-intervention and not specifically under article 2(4).
The issue of the proper characterization of economic coercion caused continuing
debate in the Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-Operation Among States. For a summary of the Special Committee's
efforts in this area see its Report, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 19, U.N. Doc. A/7619 at 31-33
(1969). For a discussion of the significance of the use of the terminology of non-
intervention rather than that of article 2(4), see Bowett, supra note 4, at 1-2.
78 Resolution Relating to the Declaration on the Prohibition of Military, Political or
Economic Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties, 24 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda
Item No. 94, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/7697 (1969).
7' For a complete list of pre-1963 international documents that reaffirmed the
principles of the Charter, in particular article 2(4), see I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 127-29 (1963).
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cribed measures or refer vaguely to "coercion," leaving to impli-
cation the extension beyond the simple use of armed force.
A notable example of the former class of instruments is the
Charter of the Organization of American States, article 19 of
which reads: "No State may use or encourage the use of coercive
measures of an economic or political character in order to force
the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages
of any kind.s ° The indirect reference to nonmilitary interven-
tion is illustrated by the Declaration on the Promotion of World
Peace and Co-operation promulgated at the Conference of Afri-
can and Asian States held at Bandung in 1955.1 The declaration
contains the principle of "Abstention by any country from exert-
ing pressures on other countries. ' 2
The documents referred to in this and the preceeding
sections evidence a growing concern over the dangers of
economic and political coercion-particularly among the less
developed nations-which have a special interest in fostering a
coercion-free international atmosphere in which to pursue their
economic and political development. If article 2(4) is to remain a
meaningful norm of international conduct, it must reflect this
growing concern.
3. A Broad Reading of Article 2(4) as a Step in the Evolution of
Norms of International Conduct
It is difficult to evaluate the argument advanced by Profes-
sor Henkin that an expansive reading of article 2(4) may under-
mine its overall effectiveness.8 3 That argument could find two
justifications: concern that the inevitable balancing of motives
and intensities that would attend the application of the norm to
instances of economic and political coercion would transfer to
other judgments under article 2(4), preventing automatic con-
demnation of even overt military aggression; or anxiety that an
irksome extension of article 2(4) would induce many states to
repudiate the norm altogether, jeopardizing present success in
the area of military force. Upon consideration, however, neither
of these fears seems compelling. With respect to the first, there is
presently no evidence to indicate that balancing in regard to
economic and political coercion would taint the consideration of
clear military violations of article 2(4). And with respect to the
second, there is certainly no doubt that the word "force" in
so2 U.S.T. 2394; as amended, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607; 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
8 1955 DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 435. For a list of international
instruments which have affirmed the principles promulgated at The Bandung Confer-
ence, see I. BROWNLIE, supra note 79, at 119-20 n.4.
82 1955 DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 436.
83 Text accompanying note 47 supra.
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article 2(4) covers armed force. The inclusion of other
categories, even if they are not universally accepted, seems more
likely to result in a gradual strengthening and broadening of the
norm's effect on the policy determinations of national leaders.
Nations, like individuals, often find themselves reluctantly grow-
ing to accept propositions which at first blush were rejected as
totally impractical.
8 4
The question whether to include economic and political
coercion within article 2(4)'s proscription must therefore turn on
the felt necessity to develop among nations a commitment to
refrain from these forms of force. That many nations seek such
a commitment is demonstrated by the expanded notions of force
included in the international documents described in the previ-
ous section. The probability that other nations will eventually
accede to a ban on at least some economic and political weapons
is perhaps best demonstrated by describing briefly several recent
examples of alleged economic and political aggression, and the
reactions of the alleged target nations.8 5
Egyptian interference with Israeli-connected ships passing
through the Suez Canal was heavily debated in the Security
Council in the 1950's.6 The Egyptian action was eventually
condemned not as aggression, but rather as a violation of the
armistice agreements between Israel and neighboring Arab
states. The draft resolution,8 7 presented jointly by the delega-
tions of France, the United Kingdom and the United States,
contained the following provision:
[T]he restrictions on the passage of goods through
the Suez Canal to Israel ports are denying to nations at
no time connected with the conflict in Palestine valuable
supplies required for their economic reconstruction,
and . . . these restrictions together with sanctions ap-
plied by Egypt to certain ships which have visited Israel
ports represent unjustified interference with the rights
of nations to navigate the seas and to trade feely with
one another, including the Arab States and Israel .... s8
A Cuban accusation of economic aggression arose in 1960 in
84 Robert W. Tucker has written that "[ilt is naivete, not sophistication, to believe that
the conviction statesmen and nations profess and the justifications they urge in defense of
their actions have no effect on the policies they pursue." (quoted in R. FALK, LAw,
MORALITY, AND WAR IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 32 (f?963)).
85 For a list of situations in which complaints of economic aggression were raised in
the Security Council, see D. Bowsrr, supra note 55, at 106 n.3 (1958).
H See, e.g., 6 U.N. SCOR, 549th-558th meetings (1951); 9 U.N. SCOR, 658-664th,
682nd-688th meetings (1954).
:7 6 U.N. SCOR, 558th meeting, U.N. Doc. S2298/Rev. 1 (1951).
8 Id., U.N. Doc. 8/2293/Rev. 2-3. This resolution was adopted by a vote of 8-0, with 3
abstentions, id., U.N. Doc. S/2298/Rev. 3 & n.1, and subsequently issued as U.N. Doc.
S/2322 (1951).
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response to the United States' reduction of the Cuban sugar
quota and decision to cease refining of Cuban crude oil. The
Cuban delegate to the Security Council, after describing
economic aggression as an "international crime" added:
The accusations made and the punitive measures pro-
posed [by the United States] have ... ranged from the
elimination of the sugar quota--economic aggression-
-to the landing of marines-military aggression. For
over eighteen months the people of Cuba have been
subjected to a policy of intimidation, coercion and
threats .... 89
Ecuador voiced similar accusations of illegal economic and politi-
cal force when the United States suspended sales of military
material to Ecuador in -response to that country's seizure of
fourteen American tuna boats within its claimed territorial
waters.9 0
More recently, there have been claims that American
economic policies effectively undermined the stability of the
Marxist Allende government in Chile and eventually contributed
to its downfall. An article published before the Chilean coup
described the United States' measures as follows:
Economic pressure on Chile has taken the form of
cutting U.S. and "international" lines of credit to the
Allende government. Two examples of this response
present themselves. Chile's application for a small loan
from the Export-Import Bank for the purchase of
commercial passenger aircraft from Boeing (a U.S.
firm) for the Chilean National Airlines was denied. As a
result the United States has forced Chile to consider
alternative European producers, perhaps a minor in-
convenience. U.S. representatives within the Inter-
American Development Bank reacting to threats to re-
duce or withhold U.S. funds to IDB because of its
willingness to listen to Chilean requests for development
loan funding have "delayed" Chilean requests (which
has the same effect as an overt denial). U.S. AID funds
have not been either requested or suggested in the case
of Chile since the end of the Frei regime.
The over-all purpose of U.S. policy is to create
economic dislocation and provoke a domestic social
89 15 U.N. SCOR, 874th meeting at 6 (1960). For the United States' denial that its
actions constituted economic aggression, see the remarks of Ambassador Lodge, id.
27-32.
90 See Java, A Review of the Progress and Problems of the Organization of American States,
65 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 284, 287 (1971).
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crisis that could lead to either the overthrow of the
Allende government by a civil-military coalition made
up of the Army, the Christian Democrats, and the
extreme right-wing National Party, or the discrediting
of the government and its defeat in the 1973 congres-
sional elections, thus undercutting the basis for future
changes. 91
These alleged incidents of economic and political aggression
demonstrate that economic and political weapons of coercion,
like military weapons, can impair a nation's sovereignty and give
rise to the resentment, humiliation and lasting damage that
breed international tension. The anxiety of the coerced nation
watching its economic life or political status be overwhelmed by
the encroaching policies of another nation is understandable, as
is the tendency of the victim to seek aid from its international
friends-particularly members of the large power blocs.
As the recent Arab oil embargo demonstrates, the more
powerful nations themselves are no longer immune to economic
coercion. Indeed, the incident provides a striking preview of a
possible future in which the industrialized nations gradually
exhaust their domestic resources, and fall prey to manipulation
by the nations to which they must look for substitutes. Nor are
the tools of economic coercion available to the lesser developed
nations and their industrialized neighbors limited to control of
natural resources: concern has recently developed, for example,
over the use of stockpiles of another nation's currency as a
potential threat to its value.a2
Economic and political coercion pose genuine threats to
international harmony, and the vulnerability of the militarily
powerful industrialized nations compounds the dangers. In a
lecture delivered at the Geneva Institute of International Rela-
tions in 1930, Professor Andre Seigfried spoke of the need to
develop a "code of international economic morality." 93 In 1974,
even more than in 1930, that need is a compelling one, and a
step toward its fulfillment would be the inclusion of economic
and political force within article 2(4)'s proscription.
C. Implications of an Expansive Reading of Article 2(4)
To say that article 2(4) covers economic and political coer-
cion as well as military force is not to say that every instance of
91 Petras & LaPorte, Can We Do Business With Radical Nationalists? Chile: No, 7 FOR.
POLICY 132, 137, 139 (1972). But see Sigmund, The "Invisible Blockade" and the Overthrow of
Allende, 52 FOR. AFFAIRS 322 (1974).
2 See Will the Arabs Use the Money Sword?, FORBES, Dec. 15, 1973, at 31.
93 Seigfried, Economic Causes of War, GENEVA INSTITUTE, PROBLEMS OF PEACE 97-98
(5th ser. 1930).
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economic or political influence is a violation of the Charter. The
disputed actions described in the previous section all are colora-
bly legitimate. If one were asked to render a legal opinion on
actions of a similar nature between two competing merchants,
the conclusion would be dictated generally by the principle of
C-eedom of contract: within the broad confines of "fair" business
actices, American law offers no relief to the businessman
v: timized by intense, even predatory, competition. Similarly,
inernational law, even the law of the Charter, does not presume
to alter the essentially gladiatorial theory of survival that governs
international trade, as long as the stakes remain commercial. It is
only when a nation undertakes to use its economic power
"against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations"94 that the norm of article 2(4) is violated.
95
This is admittedly a vague standard, and the difficulties
involved in drawing lines between proper and improper forms
of economic and political coercion are formidable. But these
difficulties are not insurmountable. There has been some success
in a similar search for the earmarks of "intermediate" coercion,
and there is every reason to believe that, given time and thought,
similar progress will be made in the area of economic and
political coercion. Only a few preliminary remarks in this regard
will be offered here.
The precise scope of a proscription on the use of economic
and political force must turn on the legal and practical
justifications for limiting the use of economic and political power
in the international arena. The United Nations Charter pro-
claims the right of self-determination of peoples96 and "the
sovereign equality of all its Members. ' 97 It is this sovereignty that
distinguishes a nation from an individual merchant within a
particular nation. When the individual considers himself
wronged but the courts deny him a remedy, it is because an
acknowledged superior entity-the State-has determined that
the alleged transgressor is in possession of a greater right. On
the international plane, the principle of national sovereignty is
superior to all others, and the Charter declares that it be subor-
dinated to none.
There is also a serious practical difference between commer-
cial and international disputes. The danger that a businessman
94 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
95 At least one commentator has read the last part of article 2(4) as a clear limitation
on the proscription which precedes it: "Article 2(4) does not forbid 'the threat or use of
force' simpliciter; it forbids it only when directed 'against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations."' J. SToNE, supra note 43, at 95.
9 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
17 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para 1.
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victimized by competition will resort to forceful self-help in
remedying the situation is minimized by the presence of the local
police and courts which stand ready to punish any such violent
retaliation. There are no effective international counterparts to
these institutions. We must therefore contend with the increased
probability that a victim nation will seek to redress, with armed
force, an impairment of its sovereignty achieved by economic
means. It is this possibility of military retaliation, always at least
theoretically within the reach of an offended state, which justifies
the imposition of legal restrictions on economic freedom.
In the final analysis, relatively few types of conduct would
constitute violations of article 2(4). Not only must such economic
or political coercion be undertaken for impermissible purposes;
ii also must be of sufficient intensity to pose a genuine threat to
the sovereignty of the target state. If not of that intensity, the
coercion would best be dealt with, in the words of one author,
"not [as] an international crime, but [as] an international tort."98
Of course, the present state of Charter law, proscribing
force only when it is used for the purposes listed in article 2(4), is
not a necessary, or perhaps even a wise, limitation in the case of
economic coercion. Even under the broad reading of article 2(4)
urged in this Comment, international law would not pass judg-
ment on economic policies not intended to impair the
sovereignty of other nations, even if these policies otherwise
forced the affected state into the direst of circumstances. The
desire to interfere with the sovereignty of another state is not the
only motive that can prompt hostile economic action: greed, or
simple envy may provide an equivalent inducement.9 9 As long
as the resort to war remains an appealing response to destructive
economic policies, whatever their motivation, the community of
nations will need to continue refining its standards of economic
behavior.
V. CONCLUSION
Examination of the language and historical background of
article 2(4) provides no clear indication of its intended meaning.
The vagueness of article 2(4)'s prohibition requires that its pres-
ent scope be determined by reference to modern notions of what
are permissible and impermissible forms of coercion, and it is in
this respect that the argument for a broad reading of article 2(4)
is most compelling. The nations of the world are growing to
'8 Higgins, supra note 43, at 276 (footnotes omitted).
' For example, the United States, which supplies Japan with vital soybeans, might
choose instead to sell soybeans to a nation which offered a higher price. The motive
would be purely greed-a desire to maximize profits-but the effect on Japan would be
no different than if the motive were a desire to interfere with the policies of the Japanese
government.
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realize, as indeed they must, that economic and political coer-
cion, like military coercion, can impair the target State's
sovereignty and create the kinds of feelings of which interna-
tional fear and tension are made. And as the events of this
century have so clearly demonstrated, tension among nations is,
like jealousy, a monster which '"doth mock the meat it feeds
upon."
